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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BOUNTIFUL WATER SUBCONSER-
V ANCY DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, ET AL., 
Defendants and Appellants 
Case No. 8426 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In the proceedings in the court below, the Respondent 
here, Bountiful Water Subconservancy District, was plaintiff, 
and the appellants here, Board of County Commissioners of 
Davis County, et al., were defendants. We here refer to them 
respectively as plaintiffs and defendants. 
Defendants' outline in their Preliminary Statement of the 
proceedings in the Court below is factually correct, except for 
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one omission. That omission is that the lower court found as 
a fact, and we do not understand that such findings is here 
attacked by defendants, as follows: 
"That in the year 1951 a committee of the House of 
the Utah State Legislature considered the question of 
the taxing powers to be given a sub-conservancy district, 
prior to amending the legislation with respect thereto." · 
In view of the fact that it is by virtue of an amendment 
to the Water Conservancy Act passed by the Legislature in 
1951, that the power to levy an ad valorem tax was vested in 
sub-districts, as contended by plaintiff, this finding is of sig-
nificance. 
Defendants have raised some five points of argument in 
support of their position that the plaintiff subconservancy 
district is without the power to levy the ad valorem tax in 
question. We will follow the same points of argument, answer-
ing them seriatim. 
POINTS OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ACT CON-
FERS THE POWER OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX-
ATION UPON WATER SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS. 
POINT II. 
THIS POWER TO TAX IS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED. 
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POINT III. 
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF UTAH, 
1951, PROVIDING FOR THE POWERS OF SUBDIS-
TRICTS SATISFIES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRE-
MENTS. 
POINT IV. 
THE POWER TO LEVY AN AD VALOREM TAX 
WILL NOT RESULT IN DOUBLE TAXATION. 
POINT V. 
THE NATURE OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
IS NOT SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE THE NECESSITY OF 
AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ACT CON-
FERS THE POWER OF AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX-
ATION UPON WATER SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICTS. 
It is without dispute that the Utah Water Conservancy 
Act was originally patterned after the Colorado Water Con-
servancy Act (Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 
et al., 106 Utah 55, 145 P. (2) 503), and that as originally 
enacted the section . thereof dealing with the creation of sub-
conservancy districts (100-11-14, U.C.A. 1943) conformed 
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substantially to a similar section of the Colorado Act. We do 
not contend that under this original provision subconservancy. 
districts had the power of ad valorem property taxation. How-
ever, in 1951, the Utah Legislature by its adoption of Chapter 
120, Laws of Utah, 1951, (now 73-9-14, U.C.A. 1953) sub-
stantially amended the original section, and with that amend-
ment all similarity to the original section, and to the corres-
ponding Colorado Section, disappeared. 
Indication of this is the fact that prior to the 1951 amend-
ment, directors of the subdistrict were the same individuals as 
the directors of the parent district. However, in 1951 the Legis-
lature provided that "a subdistrict shall be a separate entity 
within the district", and that "the court shall appoint a board 
of directors * * * who are not directors of the district." 
Furthermore, it provided, 
''The Board of Directors of a subdistrict shall have 
the same powers and duties as a district board." 
Thus it is apparent that with the 1951 amendment a sub-
district became a wholly separate and distinct entity, with a 
board of directors vested with "the same powers and duties of 
a district board." 
Now, what are the powers of a district board with respect 
to which under legislative fiat the powers of a subdistrict board 
are as inclusive? Obviously they are all the powers conferred 
by the Water Conservancy Act upon the board of the main 
district. What are they? 
Certainly they are not limited to those powers set out in 
Section 73-9-1.), because the powers of the district board are 
not so limited. For example, by Section 73-9-15, it is provided, 
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"In addition to the other means of providing revenue 
for such districts, as herein provided, the Board shall 
have power and authority to levy taxes and special 
assessments * * * as follows: 
Class A. To levy and collect taxes upon all property 
within the district as herein provided. * * * " 
and by Section 73--9-16, it is provided: 
"To levy and collect taxes under class A as herein 
provided, the board shall, in each year, determine the 
amount of money necessary to be raised by taxation, 
taking into consideration other sources of revenue of 
the district, and shall fix a rate of levy which when 
levied upon every dollar of assessed valuation of prop-
erty within the district, and with other revenues will 
raise the amount required by the district, to supply 
funds for paying expenses of organization, for sur-
veys and plans, paying the cost of construction, operat-
ing and maintaining the works of the district; pro-
vided, however, that said rate shall not exceed one-half 
mill on the dollar, prior to the commencement of con-
struction of the works, and thereafter not to exceed 
one mill on the dollar, of assessed valuation of the 
property within the district; * * * ." 
The matters covered in these two sections, 73-9-15 and 
73-9-16, are specific powers granted to the board of a district, 
not covered by 73-9-13, and creating the power of ad valorem 
property taxation, and defendants do not contend that they are 
without effect insofar as the district board are concerned. How, 
then, can it be said that they are without effect with respect 
to the subdistrict board, when the legislature has specifically 
provided that the board of the subdistrict shall have the same 
powers as the board of the district ? 
Defendants' attempted answer to that question is ( 1) the 
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legislature did not so intend it, and ( 2) the statute is ambigu-
ous, and so should be construed against the power to tax. 
As to ( 1), defendants say that if the subdistricts have the 
power of ad valorem taxation equal to that of the districts, it 
may result in what the defendants conceive to be excessively 
high taxation. 
Certainly in an arid state like Utah, where water acquisi-
tion, conservation and distribution is paramount, and where 
water is looked upon as the life stream of the health, well 
being and economy of the people, an additional property tax 
of one mill, or even five mills in areas to be served by the 
Colorado River Compact, if directed toward the acquisition, 
conservation or distribution of needed water, is anything but 
excessive. Be that as it may, defendants themselves provide the 
answer to this contention by conceding that "it is within the 
power of the legislature to levy such a tax." 
And that the legislature intended to exercise this power 
is evident by the language used, namely, that the subdistricts 
should have the same powers as the district. Not the same 
powers, less the power to levy an ad valorem tax, but the same 
powers, which of necessity includes all of the powers of the 
districts. 
Section 68-3-2, U.C.A. 1953, sets forth the principle of 
statutory construction in this state as follows: 
"The statutes establish the laws of this state re-
specting the subjects to which they relate, and their 
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice ... " 
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And Section 68-3-11, U.C.A. 1953, provides that: 
"Words and phrases are to be construed according 
to the context and the approved usage of the lan-
guage ... " 
82 C.J.S. Section 396 (c), at pages 953-4, after setting 
forth the general rule that the provisions of revenue laws 
"are not to be extended by construction or implication beyond 
the clear import of the language used," states: 
"On the other hand, the rule of strict construction 
should be applied with due regard to the intention of 
the legislature as expressed in the statute, and not so 
strictly as to defeat the legislative purpose, produce 
an unreasonable result, or embarrass the taxing author-
ity in its financial policies or the collection of taxes; 
and the rule does not permit the court to disregard the 
explicit language of the statute. The rule of strict 
construction does not require that the words of the 
statute be given the narrowest meaning of which they 
are susceptible, but the words should be given their 
full meaning. Moreover, it has been held that revenue 
statutes should not be strictly construed, but should 
receive a liberal, fair, or reasonable construction with 
a view to carrying out their purposes and intent." 
This general principle of statutory construction has re-
ceived acceptance by this Court in Price vs. Tuttle, 70 Utah 
156, 159, 258 P. 1016, where the court held: 
"In the construction of statutes it is the duty of courts 
to ascertain the intent of the legislative body and, if 
the legislation is within the constitutional power of the 
Legislature, to enforce that intent. In determining the 
intent of legislation, not only the language of the act 
may be considered, but the purposes or objects sought 
by the Legislature should be and are considered by the 
courts in determining the legislative intent." 
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And in U. S. Smelting, Refining & Milling Co. vs. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 58 Utah 168, 197 P. 902, this court stated: 
"As before pointed out, the act is intended to ac-
complish certain specific purposes, therefore all of its 
provisions, so far as consistent with the rules of con-
struction, must be construed and applied in harmony 
with and in furtherance of those purposes. It is a well-
recognized rule of interpretation that where there is 
doubt respecting the true meaning of certain words 
then 'the words should be read in the light of the con-
ditions and necessities which they are intended to meet 
and the objects sought to be attained thereby.' " (Em-
phasis added.) 
Plaintiff submits that taxation is universally regarded as 
a "power" in the usual meaning of the term, and that the 
conditions and necessities intended to be met and the objects 
sought to be attained by granting to subdistricts the same 
powers and duties as a district board, are, among others, those 
enumerated in Section 73-9-16, U.C.A. 1953, supra. 
Finally, defendants argue under this point that the statute 
is ambiguous, and so should be construed against the subdis-
trict's right to tax, and cite numerous authorities in support 
of the proposition that tax statutes of doubtful meaning should 
be construed against the taxing authority. We do not dispute 
the general rule so stated, nor the cited authorities, but do 
suggest that it may not be of universal application, as we will 
develop under the following point of argument. We do, how-
ever, challenge the premise that we have here a tax statute 
of doubtful meaning. Certainly, there is nothing doubtful or 
ambiguous on its face. It says subdistricts shall have the same 
10 
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power as districts, and words Jreer from doubt or ambiguity 
could not have been chosen. 
However, to the end of reading ambiguity into this pro-
vision, defendants argue that inconsistencies otherwise develop 
in connection with Class C assessments, and particularly be-
cause Section 73-9-18, dealing with sales of water by the dis-
trict to irrigation districts and in connection with which either 
the district or the irrigation district may levy the special 
assessments as determined by the conservancy district, further 
provides that if subdistricts are created, special assessments 
shall be made and collected as in the case of irrigation districts. 
We find no inconsistency here. This section, which cer-
tainly is far removed from the one involved in this case, simply 
provides that the subdistrict, like irrigation districts, may 
petition the district for water. If it does so, and the petition 
is granted, the cost of the water shall be defrayed by special 
assessments against the lands within the subdistrict. The 
district itself may make the levy, or it may, at its option, enter 
into a contract with the subdistrict under which the subdistrict 
may make the levy. The conclusion drawn by defendants tliat 
this procedure constitutes the subdistrict a subordinate to the 
district as a matter of law, is unjustified, because the procedure 
involved, if the assessments are to ~e levied by the subdistrict, 
is by virtue of contract between the district and subdistrict. 
The next to the last sentence of the Section ( 7 3-9-18) estab-
lishes this. It provides: 
"If the board determines that such assessments shall 
be levied by the irrigation (sub) district, the district 
shall make a contract with the irrigation (sub) district 
11 
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which shall provide among other things for the annual 
payment to the district of an amount to be obtained 
from the levy by the irrigation (sub) district of annual 
assessments in accordance with the irrigation district 
law." (Interpellations ours). 
Some difficulty of practical operation under such a contract 
between the district and subdistrict is not inconceivable, but 
that will be the problem of the parties thereto, if and when it 
arises. It has, we submit, no bearing upon the present problem. 
That it was the intention of the legislature to grant to 
subconservancy districts the power to levy an ad valorem tax 
on property within its boundaries, is further indicated by Sec-
tion 7}-9-1, U.C.A. 1953, which states in part: 
"It is declared that to provide for the conservation 
and development of the water and land resources of 
the state of Utah, and for the greatest beneficial use 
of water within this state, the organization of water 
conservancy districts, and the construction of works as 
herein defined by such districts, are a public use and 
will: 
" (a) be essentially for the public benefit and ad-
vantage of the people of the state of Utah 
" (c) indirectly benefit the state of Utah in the in-
crease of its taxable property valuation 
'' (e) directly benefit lands to be irrigated or drained 
from works to be constructed 
" (f) directly benefit lands now under irrigation by 
stabilizing the flow of water in streams and by increas-
ing flow and return of flow of water to such streams 
" (g) promote the comfort, safety and welfare of 
the people of the state of Utah, and it is therefore 
declared to be the policy of the state of Utah: 
12 
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" ( 1) To control, make use of and apply to beneficial 
use all unappropriated waters in this state to a direct 
and supplemental use of such waters for domestic, 
manufacturing, irrigation, power and other beneficial 
uses. 
'' ( 4) to promote the greater prosperity and general 
welfare of the people of the state of Utah, by en-
couraging tbe organization of water conservancy dis-
tricts as provided in this act." (Emphasis added.) 
In the case of Patterick vs. Carbon Water Conservancy 
District, supra, while declaring a water conservancy district 
to be a "public agency," and "quasi-municipal corporation," 
this court held that: 
"It is the public purposes for which a water con-
servancy district is organized that distinguishes it from 
drainage or irrigation districts. The public purposes 
for which a water conservancy district is organized 
inures to the benefit of the public generally, and there-
fore, the public can be charged for such benefits through 
general taxation." (Emphasis added.) 
Because of the nature of a subconservancy district, and 
the fact that it may be organized for all purposes for which 
a conservancy district is created, this language must, of neces-
sity, apply equally to subdistricts. The contention of defendants 
that "the subconservancy district makes sense only as a special 
improvement district" is therefore without merit and contrary 
to the holding of this court. 
Adherence to this fundamental principle of law is not 
to be found in the argument of defendants, and the clear 
and forceful statement of the legislature that subdistricts have 
the same powers as districts may not be nullified by gratuitously 
appending an exception thereto. 
13 
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POINT II. 
THIS POWER TO TAX IS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED. 
While it cannot be gainsaid that the general rule is that 
the power to tax must be expressly provided, it is equally well 
settled that the rule finds considerable relaxation in its appli-
cation to public corporations of a municipal or quasi municipal 
character. As stated in 38 Am. fur. (Mun. Corp.) Section 385: 
"In spite of the well-settled and uncontroverted rule 
that a municipal corporation has no inherent right to 
levy taxes, and to justify the exercise of the power of 
taxation must show its warrant from the legislature, 
it has frequently been held that there is no requirement 
that the delegation of authority be express, and that 
the investing of a territorial subdivision with the 
character of a municipal corporation necessarily carries 
with it the power to levy taxes for all the purposes with 
respect to which it is authorized to act. The number 
and variety of works which may be authorized, having 
a general regard to the welfare of the city or of its 
people, are mere matters of legislative discretion but 
all of them require for their execution considerable 
expenditures of money, and their authorization with-
out providing the means for such expenditures would 
be an idle and futile proceeding. Their authorization, 
therefore, implies and carries with it the power to 
adopt the ordinary means employed by such bodies 
to raise funds for their execution, unless such funds are 
otherwise provided. And the ordinary means in such 
cases is taxation. A municipality without the power of 
taxation would be a body without life, incapable of 
acting, and serving no useful purpose. For the same 
reasons, when authority to borrow money or incur an 
obligation in order to execute a public work is conferred 
upon a municipal corporation, the power to levy a 
tax for its payment or the discharge of the obligation 
14 
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accompanies it; and this, too, without any special men-
tion that such power is granted." 
To the same effect is the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. New Orleans} 
98 U. S. 381, 25 L. Ed. 225. 
''The position that the power of taxation belongs 
exclusively to the legislative branch of the government, 
no one will controvert. Under our system it is lodged 
nowhere else. But it is a power that may be delegated 
by the Legislature to municipal corporations, which 
are merely instrumentalities of the State for the better 
administration of the government in matters of local 
concern. When such a corporation is created, the power 
of taxation is vested in it as an essential attribute, for 
all the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise be 
in express terms prohibited." 
Defendants recognize this exception to the general rule, 
but deny its applicability here, contending that a subdistrict 
is not a public corporation of a municipal or quasi municipal 
nature. 
In this connection it cannot be contended that a water 
conservancy district is not a quasi municipal corporation, as 
the same have been held such by this court in the case of 
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District} supra. As 
pointed out by defendants in their brief, "a state agency is 
quasi municipal in nature only if it serves a public purpose 
or benefit." Lehi City v. MeilingJ 87 Utah 237, 48 P. (2) 530. 
We submit a subdistrict under the water conservancy act serves 
the public purpose and benefit equally with the parent district. 
The legislature in its enactment of the Water Conservancy 
Act recognized that the public purposes and objectives thereby 
1) 
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sought to be served might be attained by the creation of water 
conservancy district and subdistricts in providing for the crea-
tion of subdistricts the legislature of necessity contemplated 
that the same would contribute to the accomplishment of the 
public objectives. Subdistricts were, by the 1951 amendment, 
vested with the same power as districts. This was no idle gesture 
on the part of the legislature, for subdistricts were provided for 
under the original act, albeit with limited powers. Ten years 
later the legislature recognized that the public purposes might 
better be served by broadening the powers of the subdistricts, 
and so, by the 1951 amendment, subdistricts were vested with 
the same powers as the district. 
To say, as defendants do that subdistricts exist only for 
the benefit of "local interests" is to ignore the fact that sub-
districts are provided for under the law, and exist to the end 
of accomplishing the public purposes of the Water Conserv-
ancy Act, and for no other purpose. That this purpose is 
served on a somewhat more restricted basis than that of dis-
tricts does not detract from the fact that each is in its way 
serving the public purpose prescribed by the Act. 
Thus a subdistrict, being a quasi municipal corporation, 
finds itself within the purview of the exception enunciated 
by the foregoing authorities, with the power of taxation a 
necessary attribute to its existence and subject only to express 
limitations thereon in the Act itself. 
Aside from that, however, is the fact that we have here 
an express grant of power to tax. By Section 73-9-13, districts 
are given the power to do many things to accomplish the public 
purpose of the act. By Section 73-9-15 and 73-9-16 districts 
16 
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are in addition to the matters covered in 73-9-13, given the 
power of ad valorem taxation. By Section 73-9-14 subdistricts 
are given the same powers as districts, and if this provision 
is to be given effect it means that subdistricts are granted the 
express power to tax. What defendants are seeking to do is 
to read an exception into the grant of powers given the sub-
districts which the legislature did not see fit to express. 
POINT III. 
THE TITLE OF CHAPTER 120, LAWS OF UTAH, 
1951, PROVIDING FOR THE POWERS OF SUBDIS-
TRICTS SATISFIES THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRE-
MENTS. 
The defendants contend that the title of Chapter 120, 
Laws of Utah, 1951, does not satisfy the requirement of 
Article VI, Section 23, of the Constitution of Utah, which 
provides: 
"Except general appropnatwn bills, and bills for 
the codification and general revision of laws, no bill 
shall be passed containing more than one subject, 
which shall be clearly expressed in its title." 
The title in question is as follows: 
"An Act Amending Section 100-11-14, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 95, Laws of 
Utah 1949, Relating to Water Conservancy Districts 
and the Organization of Subdistricts, and providing the 
Method for Organizing such Subdistricts, for the Ap-
pointment of the Board of Directors and the Powers 
and Duties of Such Board." 
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The defendants argue that the title "does not adequately 
apprise nor reasonably call to the attention of the legislators 
or the public the object of the legislation if the power to levy 
an ad valorem property tax is contained in the body of the act." 
In making this argument it is apparent that the defendants 
have ignored holdings of this Court in which the purpose and 
meaning of the constitutional provision are fully discussed. 
In the early case of In re Monk, 16 Utah 100, 50 P. 810, 
the Court made the following statement as to the purpose and 
meaning of the constitutional provision: 
"This provision limits each bill to one subject, and 
requires that subject ta be clearly expressed in its title. 
It requires the purpose of the bill to be clearly stated, 
but does not require the mention of the observances to 
effectuate the purpose. The subject must be expressed 
in the act, but an analysis of the subject need not be. 
The law may contain numerous sections, and each 
section may contain one or more provisions, provided 
they are limited to requisites constituting the mode 
or way of effecting the expressed purpose. Many de-
tails may be covered by one subject. The end to be 
effectuated by the law may be expressed in general 
terms. The purpose so expressed constitutes the subject, 
and the method to be provided and the means to be 
employed in accomplishing the purpose are embraced 
in the subject, and need not be specially pointed out." 
In the case of Martineaux z·. Crabbe, 46 Utah 327, ~36, 
150 P. 301, the Court said: 
"Manifestly the purpose of this provision of the 
Constitution is to prevent the Legislature from inter-
mingling in one act two or more separate and distinct 
propositions-things which, in a legal sense, have no 
connection with, or proper relation to, each other. The 
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reasons for, and the scope of, constitutional provi-
sions of this character, are well illustrated in 26 A. & E. 
Ency. L. (2d Ed.) 575, in the following language: 
"This requirement of singleness is not intended to 
embarrass honest legislation, but only to prevent the 
vicious practice of joining in one act incongruous and 
unrelated matters; and if all the parts of a statute have 
a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly 
or indirectly to one general and legitimate subject of 
legislation, the act is not open to the objection of 
plurality, no matter how extensively or minutely it 
deals with the details looking to the accomplishment 
of the main legislative purpose." 
See also the case of State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 
P. 2d 647, 655, in which this court reviews the law on the 
subject. 
''The decisions of this court announce the rule that 
the legislature may not include matters which are 
neither related nor germane to one subject; but that the 
constitutional provision is not to be applied so as to 
hamper the law-making power in adopting compre-
hensive measures covering a whole subject, where 
matters included all have some direct connection with 
or relation to the principal subject treated; and that 
constitutional provision should be so applied as to 
guard against the real evil whcih it was intended to 
prevent. Utah State Fair Ass'n. v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 
249 P. 1016; Elder v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 P. 367, 
Martineau v. Crabbe, 46 Utah 327, 150 P. 301. See 
Crawford Statutory Construction, Sec. 98, and Cooley's 
Constitutional Limitation, 6th Ed., pp. 170, 171." 
For a very excellent discussion of the purpose and meaning 
of the constitutional provision see Cooley's Constitutional 
Limitations, Eighth Edition at pp. 292-302. The discussion of 
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the particularity required in stating the subject on pages 296 
and 297 is precisely in point. 
"The general purpose of these provisions is accom-
plished when a law has but one general object which 
is fairly indicated by its title. To require every end 
and means necessary or convenient for the accomplish-
ment of this general object to be provided for by a 
separate act relating to that alone would not only be 
unreasonable, but would actually render legislation 
impossible. It has accordingly been held that the title 
of "An Act to establish a police government for the 
City of Detroit," was not objectionable for its general-
ity, and that all matters properly connected with the 
establishment and efficiency of such a government 
including taxation for its support1 and courts for the 
examination and trial of offenders might constitu-
tionally be included in the bill under this general 
title." (Emphasis added.) 
A title need not disclose the means and instrumentalities 
provided in the body of the act for accomplishing its purpose. 
Provisions reasonably necessary for attaining the object of 
the act expressed in the title are considered included in 
the title. See Cooley 299. In Pioneer Irrigation District 
v. Bradbury1 8 Idaho 310, 68 P. 295, the title of an act 
attacked under the Idaho counterpart of Section 23 of Article 
VI was "To amend Sections 2, 11, 22 and 26 of an Act En-
titled an Act to Provide for the Acquisition of Water and 
other Property and for the Distribution of Water thereby for 
Irrigation Purposes." The Supreme Court of Idaho held that 
provisions for the levying and collection of assessments were 
covered by the title. It was also held in a leading Illinois case 
that "An Act to incorporate the Fireman's Benevolent Asso-
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ciation" may unlawfully include under this title provisions 
for levying a tax upon the income of foreign insurance com-
panies at the place of its location for the benefit of the cor-
poration. Firemen's Association v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511. 
"There has been a general disposition to construe 
the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to 
embarrass legislation by a construction whose strict-
ness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the bene-
ficial purpose for which it has been adopted." (Cooley 
P. 304.) 
Upon analysis of the title to Chapter 120 in the light of 
the rule adopted by this Court and followed in the cases cited 
above, it is clear that it meets the requirements of the con-
stitutional provision. The one subject clearly expressed in the 
title is the organization of subdistricts. The provisions in the 
chapter as to the method of organization, the appointment of 
the board of directors and the powers and duties of the board 
including the power to levy taxes and assessments are so ob-
viously "related and germane to the subject" within the mean-
ing of the rule that further argument would unduly labor the 
point. 
There is no requirement that the title be an index to the 
bill. It is absurd to suggest that the title must mention all of 
the powers granted to the district board in the long and com-
plicated conservancy act. And yet this would have to be done 
if the defendants are right in their argument that the title is 
not adequate. If the title was faulty because it did not speci-
fically mention the power to tax it was also faulty because 
it did not mention the power to levy assessments, the power 
to enter into contracts and the twenty or thirty other powers 
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mentioned specifically in the conservancy district act. The argu-
ment of the defendants that the inclusion of the power to tax 
is an "enlargement upon the subject matter" is directly con-
trary to the universally accepted rule that provisions "related 
and germane" to the general subject may be properly included 
without specific mention in the title. 
POINT IV. 
THE POWER TO LEVY AN AD VALOREM TAX 
WILL NOT RESULT IN DOUBLE TAXATION. 
It is not here contended by the defendants that sub-
districts, when created, are not lawful entities under the statute, 
vested with the powers and charged with the responsibilities 
fixed by the legislature, and wholly separate and distinct from 
the parent districts. In fact Section 73-9-14 is specific upon the 
point that ''a subdistrict shall be a separate entity within the 
district." 
It is stated on page 28 of the defendants' brief that 
"double taxation exists if both taxes have been imposed in 
the same year, for the same purpose, by the same taxing 
authority and upon property owned by the same person." There 
is no "double taxation" here because the tax would be levied 
by different taxing authorities (the district and the subdistrict) 
and for different purposes. 
It is clear from an examination of the Act that one of 
the prime objectives of districts and of subdistricts is the 
conservation and distribution of water through the construction 
and operation of works and facilities. 
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It is contemplated that the district and subdistrict will 
construct separate distribution systems. The district will con-
struct water treatment plants and the main trunk lines to the 
various parts of the district, and the subdistrict will construct, 
operate, and maintain a pressure distribution system to take 
water from the district facilities to the homes, farms and 
other places of use. Also, the subdistrict may well conserve 
and utilize water from the canyon streams and other sources. 
Once the water is available and distribution facilities 
have been constructed, it is reasonable to assume that costs 
of the water, amortization of the facilities, and operation and 
maintenance overhead will be defrayed through revenues de-
rived from sales of water. Those systems, however, do not 
just grow, but must be engineered and constructed prior to 
the time sales of water are effected. During this formative 
period subdistricts created for the purpose of providing dis-
tribution facilities must have funds with which to defray 
preliminary engineering and feasibility studies. That a sub-
district has the power under the law to borrow is no solution, 
because, except as the subdistrict has the means to repay, the 
power to borrow is but a naked right. Nor may funds necessary 
for these preliminary studies be raised by B, C or D assess-
ments for the reason that the right to levy such assessments 
are conditioned upon the availability of water, which post-
dates the incurring of these preliminary expenses. 
Accordingly, the legislature provided for ad valorem prop-
erty taxation, and in Section 73-9-16 authorized a levy of not 
to exceed one-half mill prior to commencement of construc-
tion, and one mill thereafter, for the purpose, among others, 
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of "paying expenses of organization, for surveys and plans, 
paying the cost of construction, operating and maintaining 
the works of the district." 
The requirement of these funds is no less present with 
a subdistrict than with the parent district. The subdistrict is 
burdened with the expense of organizing, surveys and plans 
the same as the main district, and without the preliminary 
one-half or one mill levy is, at that stage, wholly without 
funds. The subdistrict also has the expense of constructing, 
operating and maintaining its separate works. The fact that 
both the district and subdistrict may make the levy does not 
constitute the levy by the subdistrict unlawful upon the ground 
of double taxation. 
POINT V. 
THE NATURE OF A SUBCONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
IS NOT SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE THE NECESSITY OF 
AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION. 
Thts point of argument has to some extent been de-
veloped under plaintiff's preceding point, wherein it was 
poinred out that necessity exists for funds derived through 
the ad valorem tax for the purpose of defraying preliminary 
costs and expenses of organization of the subdistrict, surveys, 
engineering and feasibility studies, all at a time prior to that 
upon which other sources of revenue become available. 
Nor do we concede that as a general rule improvement 
districts may not levy a general property tax, as this depends 
solely upon what the Legislature provides in regard thereto. 
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We have in mind, for example improvement districts for 
water, sewer and sewage systems created pursuant to Chapter 
6, Title 17, U.C.A. 1953, which are vested by the legislature 
with the power to levy a general property tax up to four mills. 
Accordingly, it is reaSO!J.able to assume that the legislature 
intended to do what it did, namely, vest this subdistrict with 
the power to levy a general property tax of not to exceed one-
half mill at the present time and of not to exceed one mill 
after construction of the works has commenced. 
Reference to the Colorado Act on the subject is of no 
present aid. Originally, as heretofore pointed out, under both 
the Colorado and Utah acts, subdistricts had no power to levy 
ad valorem tax. Colorado solved the problem in its way by 
specifically excepting the Colorado Water Conservancy Dis-
trict and the Southwestern Water Conservancy District from 
this limitation and granted them the power to so tax. Utah 
solved it in its way by granting subdistricts generally the same 
power as districts, thus vesting subdistricts with the power to 
levy a limited general property tax. The fact that Utah did 
it in its way, instead of Colorado's way, is no indication that the 
Utah legislature intended to do less than it did. 
The fact that Colorado has loosened the restriction m 
the case of the two districts above referred to is further evi-
dence, however, that in Colorado, as in Utah, subdistricts 
may and do require the benefit of general taxing powers in 
order to discharge their public duties and meet their public 
responsibilities, a fact that Utah has likewise recognized in 
giving subdistricts the same powers as districts. 
Likewise the fact that a subdistrict acquires the water to 
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be used by it from the district, is of no particular significance, 
because having a supply of water available is but a part of the 
problem that confronts the subdistrict. It still has the problems 
and costs of organization, engineering, surveys and feasibility 
studies which it itself must assume and pay for, and with 
respect to which the general levy is a necessity. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit, accordingly, that under the law as it now 
exists, the plaintiff subdistrict has the right and power to 
make the general one-half mill levy upon the property within 
its boundaries, and the judgment of the lower court must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEITH L. STAHLE 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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